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Ruling
CAMERON BERTA VS STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, AN ILLINOIS CORPORATION
Jul 26, 2024 |24BBCV00113
Case Number: 24BBCV00113 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 Dept: NCB Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles North Central District Department B cameron berta, Plaintiff, v. state farm mutual automobile insurance company, Defendant. Case No.: 24BBCV00113 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 [TENTATIVE] order RE: motion to strike BACKGROUND A. Allegations Plaintiff Cameron Berta (Plaintiff) alleges that this action involves an insurance breach of contract and bad faith arising from an insurance claim Plaintiff made to his insurer, Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm) in connection with sideswipe damage to Plaintiffs 2017 Bentley Bentayga. Plaintiff alleges that on March 28, 2022, while Plaintiffs wife Emma Harutunyan was driving the vehicle, it was damaged as a result of a sideswipe collision with a dumpster that was jutting into Coldwater Canyon Avenue. Plaintiff alleges that despite submitting a claim and overwhelming evidence of comprehensive automobile policy benefits due and owing, Defendant refused to pay the policy benefits owed to Plaintiff. He alleges that Defendant was presented with evidence proving that the loss was caused by a covered event, including damage that directly corresponded point of impact, admission of fault by Plaintiff, and nearly 200 pages of testimony under oath, but Defendant did not adequately consider such information and evidence, and did not reasonably adjust the claim. He alleges that Defendant has failed and refused to pay Plaintiff under the terms of his insurance policy for the damage caused to his vehicle and Defendants refusal to honor its clear obligations under the policy was unjustified and unacceptable. Thus, Plaintiff filed this action to recover damages and punitive damages for Defendants bad faith mishandling of his insurance claim. The complaint, filed January 16, 2024, alleges causes of action for: (1) breach of contract; and (2) tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. B. Motion on Calendar On June 18, 2024, Defendant filed a motion to strike the punitive damages portions of Plaintiffs complaint. On July 15, 2024, Plaintiffs filed an opposition brief. On July 18, 2024, Defendant filed a reply brief. DISCUSSION Defendant moves to strike portions of the complaint alleging punitive damages. (See Notice of Motion at pp. 2-4; Compl., ¶13 at lines 16-20, 4:11-12, 5:22-23, ¶ 48 at lines 5-7, 6:9, 49:11-13, ¶51, ¶52 at lines 19-21, ¶53, ¶55, 7:9-10, ¶78, and Item 2 of the prayer.) A complaint including a request for punitive damages must include allegations showing that the plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive damages. (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) A claim for punitive damages cannot be pleaded generally and allegations that a defendant acted "with oppression, fraud and malice" toward plaintiff are insufficient legal conclusions to show that the plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive damages. (Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872.) Specific factual allegations are required to support a claim for punitive damages. (Id.) Civil Code § 3294 authorizes a plaintiff to obtain an award of punitive damages when there is clear and convincing evidence that the defendant engaged in malice, oppression, or fraud. Section 3294(c) defines the terms in the following manner: (1) "Malice" means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. (2) "Oppression" means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights. (3) "Fraud" means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury. In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant unjustly, unreasonably, and maliciously denied Plaintiffs claim for insurance benefits related to his covered loss after Plaintiff had promptly filed its claim with Defendant, Defendant without justification denied Plaintiffs claim on April 29, 2022, and Defendant again denied Plaintiffs claim on January 20, 2023 under the false pretenses that Plaintiff failed to cooperate with the investigation. (Compl. at 4:11-12, ¶¶31-42, Ex. A [January 20, 2023 Denial Letter].) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant knew Plaintiffs claim was covered under the insurance policy prior to issuing the January 20, 2023 denial letter, Defendant had no reasonable basis to conclude that the damage was man-made and intentionally inflicted, such that Defendants denial was on pretextual grounds as an act of malice towards Plaintiff intended to subject him to unjust hardship in conscious disregard of his rights. (Compl. at 5:22-23, ¶¶44-48.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant maliciously refused to tender the benefits to Plaintiff due to the high value of the vehicle and corresponding magnitude of loss and that Defendants denial demonstrated deliberate intent to cause injury to Plaintiff, the denial was a malicious effort to create artificial evidentiary hurdles to oppress Plaintiff and deprive him of the benefits under the policy, and Defendant knowingly and falsely asserted that the damage was man-made and intentionally inflicted to delay plaintiff from obtaining insurance benefits. (Compl. at 6:9-10, ¶¶49-53.) Paragraph 55 alleges: Plaintiff is informed and believes that State Farms malicious, oppressive, and fraudulent attempts to deprive him of his rights under the insurance contract are part of a broader pattern and practice of denying high-value property damage claims in furtherance of an unlawful profit scheme, in violation of Insurance Code § 790.03(h), that deprives affected individuals of their contractual, common-law, and/or statutory rights by forcing them to engage in protracted and costly litigation against State Farm in situations where State Farms liability is reasonably clear. (Compl., ¶55.) In the 2nd cause of action, he alleges that Defendants bad faith conduct was intentional malicious, wanton, and oppressive, with a willful and conscious disregard of Plaintiffs rights under the policy and with intent to deprive Plaintiff of the coverage that Defendant represented Plaintiff would receive, such that section 3294 punitive damages are warranted to punish and deter Defendant from engaging in similar conduct in the future. (Compl., ¶78.) The January 20, 2023 letter is attached as Exhibit A to the complaint. In the letter, Defendant states that it has completed its investigation regarding the claim and that Defendant has denied the claim due to a breach of the insureds duties regarding the insureds duty to cooperate and violation of the concealment or fraud provision in the policy. Defendant states that its forensic automobile mechanical engineer thoroughly investigated the vehicle and obtained Plaintiff and Emma Harutyunyans examination under oath (EUO), which revealed that that damage did not occur as they claimed; rather, the physical evidence was grossly inconsistent, and the damage was man-made and intentionally inflicted. The letter included portions of the policy stating that there was no coverage for intentionally damaged vehicles; delineated the insureds duties regarding notice of the accident and the insureds duties to cooperate; and that there is no coverage for false statements with the intent to conceal or misrepresent material facts or circ*mstances. As currently worded, the complaint fails to allege specific facts that Defendant acted intentionally, maliciously, oppressively, or with fraud when denying Plaintiffs claim. Based on the allegations of the complaint, Defendant investigated Plaintiffs claims, undertook their own analysis on how the accident occurred, requested documents from Plaintiff, and ultimately denied coverage after months of review. At most, Plaintiff has alleged that he submitted an insurance claim to Defendant, Defendant conducted an investigation, and Defendant denied the claim, which was contrary to the result Plaintiff was anticipating. While the Court takes the allegations of the complaint as true, including allegations regarding Defendants intentionality or malicious/oppressive behavior to deny the claim, such allegations must be alleged with the requisite specificity in order to pursue punitive damages. Currently, the allegations are general and conclusory. Moreover, the Plaintiff has attached Defendants position regarding the claim. Defendants position and Plaintiffs position represent opposing viewpoints, and state mere opinions. There are no specific facts from which it can be determined whether either position is true or untrue. It may be that based on discovery the Plaintiff can show specific statements that are true or untrue and that were made knowing of their truth and for a malicious purposes, but for now what is shown from the few facts alleged is a conflict of opinions regarding the evidence. For these reasons, the motion to strike the allegations for punitive damages is granted with leave to amend. CONCLUSION AND ORDER Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Companys motion to strike is granted with 20 days leave to amend. Defendant shall give notice of this order. DATED: July 26, 2024 ___________________________ John Kralik Judge of the Superior Court
Ruling
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, A CALIFORNIA RECIPROCAL INSURANCE...
Jul 25, 2024 |Civil Unlimited (Insurance Coverage (not complex)) |23CV050245
23CV050245: FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, A CALIFORNIA RECIPROCAL INSURANCE EXCHANGE vs WARREN, et al. 07/25/2024 Hearing on Demurrer DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF FARMERS' COMPLAINT, OR ALTERNATIVELY, MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS; filed by Andrew Warren (Defendant) + in Department 20Tentative Ruling - 07/22/2024 Karin SchwartzThe Demurrer filed by Angela Warren, Andrew Warren, Matthew Warren on 03/01/2024 isOverruled.Defendants Andrew Warren, Angela Warren, and Matthew Warren’s demurrer isOVERRULED.Defendants Andrew Warren, Angela Warren, and Matthew Warren’s motion to strike isDENIED.Defendants Andrew Warren, Angela Warren, and Matthew Warren’s motion for stay isGRANTED. The stay pending resolution of the underlying case is appropriate as the declaratoryrelief complaint turns on facts to be litigated in the Sacramento personal injury action.BACKGROUNDPlaintiff Farmers Insurance Exchange (“Plaintiff” or “Farmers”) filed a complaint for declaratoryrelief on November 6, 2023 against Andrew Warren, Angela Warren, Matthew Warren(collectively, “the Warrens” or “Defendants”), Kevin McKenney, Angel Sanchez, Daisy Ramirezand Javier Zacharias regarding a motor vehicle accident in September 2022.In July 2023, McKenney and Sanchez filed a complaint against Matthew Warren, AndrewWarren, and Daisy Ramirez in Sacramento County Superior Court, McKenney, et al. v. Warren,et al., case no. 23CV003653, for motor vehicle and general negligence.The Warrens tendered the Sacramento case to Farmers for defense and indemnity. Farmersagreed to defend the Warrens subject to a reservation of rights. In this matter, Farmers seeks ajudicial declaration of its rights and duties under the applicable insurance policy regarding theSeptember 2022 motor vehicle accident and underlying litigation.The Warrens now demur to the complaint or in the alternative, move to stay the declaratory reliefaction pending resolution of the Sacramento matter. The Warrens concurrently move to strike thecomplaint.LEGAL STANDARDA demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of factual allegations in a complaint. (Title Ins. Co. v.Comerica Bank-California (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 800, 807.) A plaintiff must plead facts as are SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 23CV050245: FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, A CALIFORNIA RECIPROCAL INSURANCE EXCHANGE vs WARREN, et al. 07/25/2024 Hearing on Demurrer DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF FARMERS' COMPLAINT, OR ALTERNATIVELY, MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS; filed by Andrew Warren (Defendant) + in Department 20necessary to acquaint a defendant with the nature, source and extent of her claims to providedefendant with notice of the issues sufficient to enable preparation of a defense. (Doe v. City ofLos Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 570.) A court should not sustain a general demurrer unlessthe complaint liberally construed fails to state a cause of action on any theory. (Kramer v. IntuitInc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 574, 578.)The court may strike any “irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading,” or maystrike out all or any part of a pleading “not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of thisstate, a rule of court, or an order of the court.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.)“To eliminate the risk of inconsistent factual determinations that could prejudice the insured, astay of the declaratory relief action pending resolution of the third party suit is appropriate whenthe coverage question turns on facts to be litigated in the underlying action.” (MontroseChemical Corp. v. Superior Court (1993) 6 Cal.4th 287, 301-302, internal citations omitted.)DISCUSSIONAs an initial matter, there is no proof of service on file to demonstrate timely notice of thedemurrer and motion to strike to Plaintiff. However, where, as here, a timely opposition is onfile, and Plaintiff does not request a continuance of the hearing and does not claim prejudice byreason of insufficient notice or service, any claim of inadequate service or notice is waived.(Carlton v. Quint (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 690, 697.) The Court notes that Defendants also failedto file the proof of service as to its earlier motion to quash. Defendants are reminded that proofsof service must be filed with the Court to demonstrate proper notice pursuant to C.C.P. § 1005.DemurrerDefendants demur to the complaint on the grounds that (1) Farmers fails to state facts sufficientto support its claim for declaratory relief; (2) the complaint is uncertain, ambiguous; and (3)unintelligible; and the complaint is “devoid of any undisputed facts or facts that can be judiciallynoticed.”The Complaint Adequately Alleges Declaratory ReliefA cause of action for declaratory relief needs to only set forth facts showing the existence of anactual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective parties under a contractand requests that these rights and duties be adjudged by the court. (Columbia Pictures Corp. v.De Toth (1945) 26 Cal.2d 753, 760.)The Complaint alleges that an actual, present, and justiciable controversy exists between theparties because the Warrens are seeking defense and indemnity under an insurance policy for the SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 23CV050245: FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, A CALIFORNIA RECIPROCAL INSURANCE EXCHANGE vs WARREN, et al. 07/25/2024 Hearing on Demurrer DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF FARMERS' COMPLAINT, OR ALTERNATIVELY, MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS; filed by Andrew Warren (Defendant) + in Department 20Sacramento action, whereas Farmers argues that no coverage is available because of an exclusionwithin the policy barring coverage for actions “[a]rising out of the use or operation by an insuredperson of any car while it is being used to flee a law enforcement agent or crime scene.”(Complaint ¶¶ 19, 27, 29.) The Complaint attaches the police report and the complaint in theSacramento action in support of its claim that Matthew Warren’s actions fall under the insurancepolicy’s exclusion. (Complaint Exhs. 1 and 2.)The Complaint adequately alleges a cause of action for declaratory relief. On the grounds that thecomplaint fails to state facts to state a cause of action, the demurrer is OVERRULED.The Complaint is Not UncertainUnder C.C.P. § 430.10, subdivision (f), a complaint is subject to demurrer where the pleading isuncertain, that is, ambiguous and unintelligible. Demurrers for uncertainty are disfavored and aregranted only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond.(Morris v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 279, 292.)While the demurrer states that it is made on the grounds of uncertainty (Demurrer at p. 2),Defendants’ memorandum of points and authorities is devoid of any factual or legal argument tosupport this contention. As discussed above, the complaint adequately alleges a cause of actionfor declaratory relief.On the grounds that the complaint is uncertain, the demurrer is OVERRULED.At the Pleading Stage, the Complaint is Adequately PledThe Warrens argue that the complaint is subject to demurrer because it is devoid of anyundisputed facts or facts that can be judicially noticed. (Demurrer at pp. 1, 3.) Defendantscontend that the allegations in the Sacramento action and the statements in the police report areinadmissible hearsay.However, a complaint is not required at the pleadings stage to assert undisputed facts (as in amotion for summary judgment or adjudication) or solely judicially noticeable facts. Generally,the rule for pleading in civil cases is that the complaint need only set forth ultimate factsconstituting its causes of action, not the evidence by which a plaintiff proposes to prove thosefacts. (Gutierrez v. Carmax Auto Superstores California (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1234, 1260.) Aplaintiff is only required to set forth essential facts of her cause with reasonable precision andwith particularity sufficient to acquaint a defendant with the nature, source, and extent of herclaims. (Ludgate Ins. Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 592, 608.) Specificityis pleadings is generally not required in light of modern discovery procedures. (Id.) SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 23CV050245: FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, A CALIFORNIA RECIPROCAL INSURANCE EXCHANGE vs WARREN, et al. 07/25/2024 Hearing on Demurrer DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF FARMERS' COMPLAINT, OR ALTERNATIVELY, MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS; filed by Andrew Warren (Defendant) + in Department 20A Stay of This Action Will Avoid Potential Prejudice to the Warrens in the SacramentoCaseAs an alternative to their demurrer, the Warrens move to stay the instant insurance coverageaction pending final resolution of the underlying Sacramento action. The Warrens argue that thestay is appropriate to avoid the risk of inconsistent factual determinations that could prejudicethem, as the insured of Plaintiff, as the coverage question at issue in this action turns on facts tobe litigated in the underlying action.Upon review of the complaint in the Sacramento action, attached as Exhibit 2 to the Complaintin the instant case, the Court agrees that a stay is appropriate. In the Sacramento case, plaintiffsKevin McKenney and Angel Sanchez allege that Matthew Warren failed to submit to a stop bythe California Highway Patrol, “attempted to flee and ran a red light when his vehicle collidedwith a vehicle.” (Sacramento Complaint p. 4.) The Sacramento complaint alleges motor vehiclenegligence and general negligence against Matthew and Andrew Warren.Here, Farmers disputes that coverage is available to the Warrens in the Sacramento actionbecause the insurance policy does not insure bodily injury when an insured flees lawenforcement. (Complaint at ¶¶ 19, 27-28.) Farmers alleges that the underlying incident “aroseout of Matthew Warren’s use of his vehicle to flee law enforcement agents.” (Id. at ¶ 27.) As theissue in this declaratory relief action turns on facts to be litigated in the Sacramento case, interalia, whether Matthew Warren used his vehicle to flee law enforcement agents when his vehiclecollided with another vehicle, a stay is appropriate to eliminate the risk of inconsistent factualdeterminations that could prejudice the Warrens. (Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Superior Court,supra, 6 Cal.4th at 301-302.)The Court STAYS the instant proceedings pending resolution of Sacramento Case No.23CV003653.Motion to StrikeDefendants move to strike the entire complaint on the grounds on the same grounds argued intheir demurrer – that the complaint relies on facts not subject to judicial notice and inadmissiblehearsay. As the Court finds that the complaint is adequately pleaded at this stage in theproceedings, the motion to strike is DENIED.EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONSOn Reply, Defendants object to Plaintiff’s Exhibits 2, 3, 4, and 5 included in the Oppositionpapers on the grounds that they constitute protected attorney-client communications. Exhibits 2-5are email communications from January – February 2024 between counsel for Farmers and SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 23CV050245: FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, A CALIFORNIA RECIPROCAL INSURANCE EXCHANGE vs WARREN, et al. 07/25/2024 Hearing on Demurrer DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF FARMERS' COMPLAINT, OR ALTERNATIVELY, MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS; filed by Andrew Warren (Defendant) + in Department 20defense counsel.The Court finds that the communications are not protected by attorney-client privilege as theyare communications between Farmers’ counsel and the Warrens’ independent counsel regardingservice of Farmers’ declaratory relief complaint and meet and confer regarding the Warrens’demurrer. Andrew Warren is copied on some of the emails from defense counsel, but none of theemails are from Mr. Warren nor directed specifically at Mr. Warren.Pursuant to the foregoing, Defendants’ objections to Exhibits 2, 3, 4 and 5 are OVERRULED.If a party does not timely contest the foregoing Tentative Ruling and appear at the hearing, theTentative Ruling will become the order of the court.HOW DO I CONTEST A TENTATIVE RULING?THROUGH ECOURTNotify the Court and all the other parties no later than 4:00 PM one court day before thescheduled hearing, and briefly identify the issues you wish to argue through the following steps:1. Log into eCourt Public Portal2. Case Search3. Enter the Case Number and select “Search”4. Select the Case Name5. Select the Tentative Rulings Tab6. Select “Click to Contest this Ruling”7. Enter your Name and Reason for Contesting8. Select “Proceed”BY EMAILSend an email to the DEPARTMENT CLERK and all the other parties no later than 4:00 PM onecourt day before the scheduled hearing. This will permit the department clerk to send invitationsto counsel to appear remotely.BOTH ECOURT AND EMAIL notices are required.
Ruling
HEANG KROUCH, ET AL. VS PR2020, LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY
Aug 01, 2024 |21STLC06411
Case Number: 21STLC06411 Hearing Date: August 1, 2024 Dept: 20 Tentative Ruling Judge Kevin C. Brazile Department 20 Hearing Date: August 1, 2024 Case Name: Krouch, et al. v. PR2020, LLC, et al. Case No.: 21STLC06411 Matter: Motion for Sanctions Moving Party: Defendant PR2020, LLC Responding Party: Unopposed Notice: OK Ruling: The Motion is granted in part. Moving party to give notice. If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic. On May 2, 2023, a Second Amended Complaint (SAC) was filed relating to the failure to pay attorneys fees after losing an unlawful detainer action and to repair property pursuant to commercial leases. On June 23, 2023, a Cross-Complaint was filed relating to the failure to pay rent. On April 5, 2024, the Court granted Defendant PR2020, LLCs three motions to compel responses to form interrogatories, special interrogatories, and requests of production from Plaintiff Robert Gooch. The Court required responses within 30 days. Defendant now seeks terminating, issue, evidentiary, and/or monetary sanctions because Gooch failed to comply with the Courts April 5, 2024, ruling. California discovery law authorizes a range of penalties for conduct amounting to misuse of the discovery process. (Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 991.) Misuses of the discovery process include [u]sing a discovery method in a manner that does not comply with its specified procedures (Code Civ. Proc. § 2023.010(b)); [f]ailing to respond or to submit to an authorized method of discovery (id., subd. (d)); [m]aking an evasive response to discovery (id., subd. (f)); and [d]isobeying a court order to provide discovery (id., subd. (g).) Code Civ. Proc. § 2023.030 authorizes a trial court to impose monetary sanctions, issue sanctions, evidence sanctions, or terminating sanctions against anyone engaging in conduct that is a misuse of the discovery process. In selecting the appropriate sanction, a trial court should consider both the conduct being sanctioned and its effect on the party seeking discovery, and should tailor the sanction to fit the harm caused by the abuse of the discovery process. (Doppes, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 992.) The trial court cannot impose sanctions for misuse of the discovery process as a punishment. (Ibid.) A terminating sanction is a proper sanction to punish the failure to comply with a rule or an order only if the courts authority cannot be vindicated through the imposition of a less severe alternative. (Rail Services of America v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 323, 331 [concerning dismissal for a plaintiffs refusal to comply with discovery]; see also Mileikowsky v. Tenet Healthsystem (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 262, 279-80 [[W]here a violation is willful, preceded by a history of abuse, and the evidence shows that less severe sanctions would not produce compliance with the discovery rules, the trial court is justified in imposing the ultimate sanction.].) Plaintiff Gooch did not file an opposition such that it seems that Gooch is not interested in participating in discovery. Therefore, the Court will enter a terminating sanction by striking Goochs SAC, striking his Answer to the Cross-Complaint, and entering his default. The Court will not award any other sanctions. The Motion is granted in part as set forth herein. Moving party to give notice. If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Ruling
WOOLSEY vs STATE FARM GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY
Jul 22, 2024 |CVSW2206963
WOOLSEY VS STATE FARMCVSW2206963 GENERAL INSURANCE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENTCOMPANYTentative Ruling:The hearing has been continued on the court’s own motion due to Crowdstrikeshutdown issues.
Ruling
MICHAEL ELY ET AL VS. UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION ET AL
Jul 25, 2024 |CGC19579882
Matter on the Discovery Calendar for Thursday, Jul-25-2024, Line 1, DEFENDANT UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION's Motion To Compel. Pro Tem Judge William Lynn, a member of the California State Bar who meets all the requirements set forth in CRC 2.812 to serve as a temporary judge, has been assigned to hear this motion. Prior to the hearing all parties to the motion will be asked to sign a stipulation agreeing that the motion may be heard by the Pro Tem Judge. If all parties to the motion sign the stipulation, the hearing will proceed before the Judge Pro Tem who will decide the motion with the same authority as a Superior Court Judge. If a party appears by telephone, the stipulation may be signed via fax or consent to sign given by email. If not all parties to the motion sign the stipulation, the Pro Tem Judge will hold a hearing on the motion and, based on the papers submitted by the parties and the hearing, issue a report in the nature of a recommendation to the Dept. 302 Judge, who will then decide the motion. If a party does not appear at the hearing, the party will be deemed to have stipulated that the motion will be decided by the Pro Tem Judge with the same authority as a Superior Court Judge. The Pro Tem Judge has issued the following tentative ruling: The unopposed motion of Defendant United Services Automobile Association is granted. Plaintiffs shall provide code-compliant verified responses without objections to Defendant's First Supplemental Interrogatories and First Supplemental Requests for Production of Documents within 14 days of service of notice of entry of this order. The Court also notes that this motion improperly combined two motions and violates the filing fee requirements of Govt. C. Sec. 70617(a)(f). For the 9:00 a.m. Discovery calendar, all attorneys and parties are required to appear remotely. Hearings will be conducted by videoconference using Zoom. To appear at the hearing, go to the court's website at sfsuperiorcourt.org under "Online Services," navigate to "Tentative Rulings," and click on the appropriate link (DISCOVERY, DEPARTMENT 302 DAILY AT 9:00 A.M.), or dial the corresponding number and use the meeting ID, and password for Discovery Department 302. Any party who contests a tentative ruling must send an email to williamclynn@gmail.com with a copy to all other parties by 4pm stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. The subject line of the email shall include the line number, case name and case number. If the tentative ruling is not contested, the parties are deemed to have stipulated to the Pro Tem hearing the motion and the Pro Tem will sign an order confirming the tentative ruling. The prevailing party is required to prepare a proposed order repeating verbatim the substantive portion of the tentative ruling and must e-mail it to the Judge Pro Tem. The court no longer provides a court reporter in the Discovery Department. Parties may retain their own reporter, who may appear remotely. A retained reporter must be a California certified court reporter (CSR), for only a CSR's transcript may be used in California courts. If a CSR is being retained, include in your email all of the following: their name, CSR and telephone numbers, and their individual work email address. =(302/JPT)
Ruling
2024CUPT025644 IN THE MATTER OF G.N.
Jul 22, 2024 |Benjamin F. Coats |Petition For Approval for Transfer of Structured Settlement Payment Rights Pursuant to California Insurance Code 10134 ET SEQ. |2024CUPT025644
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF VENTURA Tentative Ruling 2024CUPT025644: IN THE MATTER OF G.N. 07/22/2024 in Department 43 Petition For Approval for Transfer of Structured Settlement Payment Rights Pursuant to California Insurance Code 10134 ET SEQ.The morning calendar in courtroom 43 will normally begin at 8:45. Please arrive for your hearingno later than 8:30 a.m. The door will be opened before the calendar is called.The Court allows appearances by CourtCall and Zoom, but parties must both use the same platformif appearing remotely. The court’s equipment is not capable of handling mixed remoteappearances. Counsel are expected to cooperate in this regard. Refer to the Courtroom 43 webpagefor more information about remote appearances.If appearing by CourtCall, call in no later than 8:30 a.m. If you wish to appear by CourtCall, youmust make arrangements with CourtCall by 4:00 p.m. the court day before your scheduled hearing.Requests for approval of a CourtCall appearance made on the morning of the hearing will not begranted. No exceptions will be made.For Zoom appearances, you must email the court at Courtroom43@ventura.courts.ca.gov with asimultaneous copy to all other counsel/self-represented parties no later than 3:00 p.m. the courtday before the appearance. INCLUDE THE PHRASE "ZOOM APPEARANCE ON (DATE OFHEARING)" IN THE SUBJECT LINE OF YOUR EMAIL. You will receive the login informationfor your appearance in reply to your email. If appearing by Zoom, log into the hearing no laterthan 8:30 a.m. The Court will transfer you to the meeting room when your matter is called. Do notattempt to appear by Zoom without following these instructions.With respect to the tentative ruling below, no notice of intent to appear is required. If you wish tosubmit on the tentative ruling you can fax notice to Judge Coats's secretary, Ms. McIntyre at 805-477-5894, stating that you submit on the tentative. Or, you may emailCourtroom43@ventura.courts.ca.gov with all counsel copied on the email. Do not call in lieu ofsending a fax or email. If you submit on the tentative without appearing and the opposing partyappears, the hearing will be conducted in your absence. If you are the moving party and do notcommunicate to the Court that you submit on the tentative or you do not appear at the hearing, theCourt may deny your motion irrespective of the tentative.Unless stated otherwise at the hearing, if a formal order is required but not signed at the hearing,the prevailing party shall prepare a proposed order and comply with CRC 3.1312 subdivisions (a),(b), (d) and (e). The signed order shall be served on all parties and a proof of service filed with thecourt. A "notice of ruling" in lieu of this procedure is not authorized.Motion: Petition for approval of transfer of structured settlement rights.Tentative Ruling: The petition is GRANTED. 2024CUPT025644: IN THE MATTER OF G.N.The Court has considered the following factors:(1) The reasonable preference and desire of the payee to complete the proposed transaction,considering the payee's age, mental capacity, legal knowledge, and apparent maturity level.(2) The stated purpose of the transfer is to purchase a vehicle and pay off debt.(3) The payee's financial and economic situation: The Petitioner, Gladis Nava, is 21 years old andlives in Oxnard. There is no indication whether she is employed or has another source of income.She does not have any court ordered child support obligations. (Exhibit D.)(4) The terms of the transaction, including whether the payee is transferring monthly or lump sumpayments or all or a portion of his or her future payments: Nava is selling certain payments underthe structure settlement amount to $84,261.56 for $30,000. (Exhibit D ¶¶7 & 8.) She will retainthe remainder of her interest in the structured settlement. (Exhibit D ¶10.)(5) Whether, when the settlement was completed, the future periodic payments that are the subjectof the proposed transfer were intended to pay for the future medical care and treatment of the payeerelating to injuries sustained by the payee in the incident that was the subject of the settlement andwhether the payee still needs those future payments to pay for that future care and treatment: Theyare not. (Exhibit D)(6) Whether, when the settlement was completed, the future periodic payments that are the subjectof the proposed transfer were intended to provide for the necessary living expenses of the payeeand whether the payee still needs the future structured settlement payments to pay for futurenecessary living expenses: They are not. (Exhibit D).(7) Whether the payee is, at the time of the proposed transfer, likely to require future medical careand treatment for the injuries that the payee sustained in connection with the incident that was thesubject of the settlement and whether the payee lacks other resources, including insurance,sufficient to cover those future medical expenses: She is not.(8) Whether the payee has other means of income or support, aside from the structured settlementpayments that are the subject of the proposed transfer, sufficient to meet the payee's future financialobligations for maintenance and support of the payee's dependents, specifically including, but notlimited to, the payee's child support obligations, if any: Petitioner has no minor children and nochild support obligations. (Exhibit D)(9) Whether the financial terms of the transaction, including the discount rate applied to determinethe amount to be paid to the payee, the expenses and costs of the transaction for both the payeeand the transferee, the size of the transaction, the available financial alternatives to the payee toachieve the payee's stated objectives, are fair and reasonable. They are reasonable.(10) Whether the payee completed previous transactions involving the payee's structuredsettlement payments and the timing and size of the previous transactions and whether the payeewas satisfied with any previous transaction: She has not previously sold payments. (Exhibit D). 2024CUPT025644: IN THE MATTER OF G.N.(11) Whether the transferee attempted previous transactions involving the payee's structuredsettlement payments that were denied, or that were dismissed or withdrawn prior to a decision onthe merits, within the past five years: She has not.(12) Whether, to the best of the transferee's knowledge after making inquiry with the payee, thepayee has attempted structured settlement payment transfer transactions with another person orentity, other than the transferee, that were denied, or which were dismissed or withdrawn prior toa decision on the merits, within the past five years. It does not appear to be the case.(13) Whether the payee, or his or her family or dependents, are in or are facing a hardship situation:This is not clear.(14) Whether the payee received independent legal or financial advice regarding the transaction:She declined advice.(15) Any other factors or facts that the payee, the transferee, or any other interested party calls tothe attention of the reviewing court or that the court determines should be considered in reviewingthe transfer. No other relevant factors.The Court makes the following findings:1) The transfer is in the best interest of the payee, taking into account the welfare and support ofthe payee's dependents.(2) The payee has been advised in writing by the transferee to seek independent professional adviceregarding the transfer and has either received that advice or knowingly waived, in writing, theopportunity to receive the advice.(3) The transferee has complied with the notification requirements pursuant to paragraph (2) ofsubdivision (f), the transferee has provided the payee with a disclosure form that complies withSection 10136, and the transfer agreement complies with Sections 10136 and 10138.(4) The transfer does not contravene any applicable statute or the order of any court or othergovernment authority.(5) The payee understands the terms of the transfer agreement, including the terms set forth in thedisclosure statement required by Section 10136.(6) The payee understands and does not wish to exercise the payee's right to cancel the transferagreement.The Court will sign the proposed order.
Ruling
Patricia Ortega vs. California Fair Plan Association
Jul 25, 2024 |24CECG00294
Re: Patricia Ortega v. California Fair Plan Association Superior Court Case No. 24CECG00294Hearing Date: July 25, 2024 (Dept. 403)Motion: Defendant California Fair Plan Association’s Demurrer to Plaintiff Patricia Ortega’s Complaint If oral argument is timely requested, it will be entertained on Thursday, August 1, 2024, at 3:30 p.m. in Department 403.Tentative Ruling: To overrule defendant California Fair Plan Association’s demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc.§ 430.10, subd. (e).) Defendant California Fair Plan Association is granted 10 days’ leaveto file its answer to the complaint. The time in which the answer can be filed will run fromservice by the clerk of the minute order.Explanation: A complaint for declaratory relief must demonstrate: (1) a proper subject ofdeclaratory relief, and (2) an actual controversy involving justiciable questions relating tothe rights or obligations of a party. (Brownfield v. Daniel Freeman Marina Hospital (1989)208 Cal.App.3d 405, 410.) The “actual controversy” requirement concerns the existenceof present controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective partiespursuant to contract, statute, or order. (Id.) A proper subject would be a determinationof any question of construction or validity arising under an instrument or contract, or adeclaration of the parties’ rights or duties. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1060.) The interpretationof ordinances and statutes are proper matters for declaratory relief. (Walker v. LosAngeles County (1961) 55 Cal.2d 626, 637 Here, plaintiff had a property policy with defendant. (Compl., ¶ 4.) She requestedclaim related documents pursuant to California Insurance Code section 2071. (Compl.,¶ 23.) The underlying dispute is centered on whether the independent adjuster reportsand photographs fall within the definition of a claim related document. (Compl., ¶ 26,27.) Plaintiff seeks a judicial determination of the rights and obligations of the partiesunder the insurance code. (Compl., ¶ 32.) These facts as pled in the complaint are taken as true and thus present a plausiblecause of action – there is an actual controversy between the parties that is subject todeclaratory relief. Plaintiff would be entitled to relief, though what relief need not bedetermined at this time. The plaintiff’s intent and the merits of plaintiff’s claims are issuesthat can be argued and a demurrer is not the method by which they should be discussedor decided. Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice may be granted to the extent thatdemonstrates such records exist, but not for the truths of any of the matters assertedtherefrom. (Steed v. Dept. of Consumer Affairs (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 112, 120-121.) Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Proceduresection 1019.5, subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary. The minute orderadopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerkwill constitute notice of the order.Tentative RulingIssued By: JS on 7/24/2024 . (Judge’s initials) (Date)
Ruling
Hofmeyer VS Safeco Insurance Company of Illinois
Jul 25, 2024 |Civil Unlimited (Insurance Coverage (not complex)) |RG20061553
RG20061553: Hofmeyer VS Safeco Insurance Company of Illinois 07/25/2024 Hearing on Motion in Limine Special Set Motions in Limine; filed by Safeco Insurance Company of Illinois (Defendant) in Department 520Tentative Ruling - 07/22/2024 Julia SpainSafeco's Motion #1 re: Priority and Exhaustion of Insurance Coverage and Plaintiffs Motion #1to Exclude Evidence of Other Insurance Coverage are continued to August 9, 2024 at 2pm inDept. 520. This continuance is not subject to contest.
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